Russian disinformation threatens breakout of conflict in Kosovo
An explosion of Russian disinformation threatened a breakout of conflict in Kosovo, highlighting the urgent need to address the declining information environment in the region, writes Antoinette Nikolova.
Antoinette Nikolova is the Director of the Balkan Free Media Initiative.
The leaders of Serbia and Kosovo are expected for urgent talks in Brussels on Thursday (18 August) following the flare-up of tensions between the two countries. Abuse of media and social media should be top of the agenda.
Here’s why. On 1 August, a dispute over rules on car license plates evolved into a major crisis after an explosion of disinformation from Russia-linked websites and social media accounts claimed that fighting had broken out in Kosovo, and that Serbian forces had entered the country, and that Russia would support them. Panic ensued until it became clear that these claims were in no way true.
Thankfully, real conflict was averted this time. But experts say the attack was an aggressive Russian hybrid operation designed to provoke another European war and deflect attention from Ukraine. There is no reason to think they will not try again.
In Kosovo, such a threat carries particular weight. In 2004, Serbians were wrongly accused of drowning three ethnic Albanian children. A media storm ensued, leading to an outbreak of ethnic violence that left 19 people dead, and hundreds more injured. According to OSCE, ‘without the reckless and sensationalist reporting on 16 and 17 March, events could have taken a different turn.”
Both Serbia and Kosovo have learned little from this tragedy. Divisive and aggressive media rhetoric is common from both sides – often stemming from their political leaders. Indeed, in the case of Vučić, Thursday’s meeting, which should be a major opportunity to diffuse tensions, is already being abused as a media opportunity.
The Serbian president told state broadcaster RTS that he expected nothing from the talks and that anyone who thinks it’s possible to maintain peace with Albin Kurti, Kosovo’s Prime Minister, is wrong.
It is also telling that Vučić has made no comment whatsoever on Russia’s alleged hybrid attack, despite the fact it included fake announcements attributed to the president himself.
This should come as no surprise. Vučić has long weaponised Serbian media to spread divisive rhetoric around Kosovo and other issues and has presided over a major decline in Serbia’s information environment. V-Dem Institute reported that under his presidency, Serbia has transformed from an electoral democracy to an electoral autocracy “after continued assaults on the judiciary and restrictions on the media and civil society”.
These restrictions have allowed Russian disinformation to flourish in the mainstream media. Given both historic and recent events in Kosovo, this must now be viewed as a serious security issue for the region.
Pro-Russian narratives are prevalent in the state-backed Serbian media. The day after Russia invaded Ukraine in February, Serbia’s most popular tabloid Informerreported on its front page: “Ukraine Attacks Russia!”
This shocking example is only the tip of the iceberg. A recent study conducted by the Balkan Free Media Initiative found that Russian disinformation is regularly repeated in mainstream media sources in Serbia, before being disseminated widely across social media.
While much of Europe has now banned Russia’s state-owned propaganda outlet RT, the broadcaster announced in July it would be opening new offices in Serbia.
The issue is compounded by the fact that credible, unbiased news outlets face constant pressure from the government and attempts to squeeze them out of the market.
Media freedom campaigners criticised Serbia’s media regulator this month after it awarded all four available national TV licenses to pro-government media outlets. There is speculation a fifth and final license could go to the Hungarian station, TV2 which has close links to Viktor Orbán.
The awarding of national TV licenses, which are only renewed every ten years, is one in a long line of opportunities to improve media pluralism undermined by the Serbian authorities.
These battles for media freedom might seem technical or insignificant in isolation. But they contribute to the massive decline in the information environment that makes Kosovo a perfect target for Russia and other malign actors.
In the current context, Thursday’s meeting is more likely to be used as a media opportunity to reiterate division rather than herald a breakthrough in negotiations. This must not be allowed to continue. To protect Kosovo, the EU must do more than host talks. It must take active steps to improve media freedom in the Balkans.
This op-ed was published on Euractiv on 16 August 2022.
